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18 The ‘virtuous circle’
Religion and the practices of 
happiness1
Elaine Graham
Growing prosperity since 1945 in developed economies is now being shared 
increasingly by developing economies. Yet experience and research widely 
recognize that above certain income levels, greater prosperity is not matched by 
greater happiness, but is accompanied instead by greater social and individual 
distress, manifested, for example, in increasing crime and ill- health, such as 
depression. Much evidence now also suggests that such trends are exacerbated 
by high levels of inequality in society. This so- called ‘Happiness Hypothesis’ is 
explored across a range of disciplines in a field of ‘overlapping literatures’ from 
the 1990s onwards (Atherton, 2008). They all confirm that increasing economic 
prosperity in Western economies is not matched by greater levels of recorded 
happiness. These literatures serve as a multidisciplinary ‘entry- point’ for the 
excavation of further layers of debate about the relationship between global eco-
nomic change, social capital, human behaviour and political institutions, as well 
as their ethical and religious aspects. It is notable that the various literatures on 
wellbeing are mindful of these latter dimensions, and increasingly are focusing 
on the importance of values and beliefs in human satisfaction or quality of life.
 Alongside these developments has been the re- emergence of religion globally, 
including into public life, and more recently matched by the growing interest, 
especially in the West, in the religious contribution to ‘social capital’, or the 
capacity to build social networks within and across various parts of civil society. 
It is the potential link between this latter development and the growing concern 
over the paradox of prosperity and human wellbeing that forms the basis of this 
chapter, which will focus on interacting this so- called ‘happiness hypothesis’ 
with a consideration of the potential role and contribution of religious values and 
organizations. It has further resonances with emerging interest in faith- based 
economics and ethical aspects of development, debt relief and poverty reduction: 
with the morality of the market, if you will, and the question of values, not just 
in terms of informing the ‘moral compass’ (Brown 2007; see also Davis et al. 
2008: 13) of individuals as they chart their course through life, but raising ques-
tions about the very purposes and ends to which political economy as a whole 
should be directed.
 If the question of happiness and wellbeing (especially in relation to economic 
prosperity) is multidisciplinary and multidimensional, then the question of reli-
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Religion and the practices of happiness  225
gion emerges as one, not insignificant element of that. Given that such a broad- 
based debate raises questions of meaning and value, this opens new doors for 
theological input, and there are significant overlaps between philosophical think-
ing about the good life, particularly around virtue ethics, and moral theology. 
My intention here is to trace these convergences and offer some ways forward.
Religion and the pursuit of happiness
What the literature on wellbeing acknowledges time after time is the significance 
for individuals of what Richard Layard terms a strong philosophy of life. This is 
not identical with organized religion, even though Layard at one point does 
indeed declare that ‘people who believe in God are happier’ (Layard 2005: 72). 
Nevertheless, some kind of correlation does seem to be evident. For example, 
the Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health at Duke University publishes 
digests of research in this area, and reports on a series of clinical studies which 
suggest, among other things, that rates of recovery of cancer patients may be 
better among those who report involvement in faith communities, as well as 
better longevity among those who attend synagogue, slower rates of cognitive 
decline in those experiencing the onset of dementia, and some, marginal, impact 
on aspects of coping strategies in relation to recovery from serious illness 
(Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health 2007). The evidence is varied but 
rich, therefore, although clearly such research raises important questions of 
method and interpretation. For example, is the incidence of better mental health 
among religious people due to divine influence or human solidarity? Do differ-
ent religious traditions deliver different degrees of wellbeing? What about reli-
gious traditions that stress individual practices, such as meditation, in comparison 
to more corporate ones? What is the relationship between ‘religion’ and ‘spiritu-
ality’ – organizational, formal dimensions of observance, say, as opposed to a 
more subtle appreciation of existential or transcendent dimensions to life?
 In terms of explaining the correlation between religion and wellbeing, the 
consensus seems to be that there is powerful ‘added value’ in religion (Coyte et 
al. 2007; Eckersley 2007). It appears to be down to a combination of factors, 
among which social support and membership of a faith community is pre- 
eminent, but which extends to other forms of religious practice, such as prayer, 
reading one’s sacred Scriptures, a sense of meaning and existential belief system 
and a well- articulated moral code. While other (secular) activities might provide 
some of these elements, commentators such as Richard Eckersley argue that reli-
gion ‘packages’ these components effectively and accessibly (Eckersley 2007).
 More specifically, John Swinton (2001: 64–92) postulates various tangible 
mechanisms by which religious affiliation might contribute to greater mental and 
emotional wellbeing:
• Regulation of lifestyle and behaviour – such as restriction of intake of 
alcohol.
• Provision of resources, such as social support and networks.
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• Promotion of positive self- esteem.
• Acquisition of specific life skills and coping resources – such as a frame-
work of understanding illness, stress or loss.
• Generation of positive emotions – cultivation of disposition towards for-
giveness, hope, transformation.
All in all, wellbeing comes from being connected and engaged, from being sus-
pended in a web of relationships and interests. This gives meaning to people’s 
lives (Eckersley 2007: S54).
Social capital, religion and wellbeing
What is interesting is how much of the social capital literature intersects with the 
literature on happiness, in terms of offering insights into the devices by which 
individuals are able to feel a greater connection to the wider community – in 
other words, the very kinds of networks which seem to engender a better quality 
of life. So, one policy document identifies some of the positive benefits of strong 
social capital: high GDP; higher educational attainment; lower levels of crime 
(as a result of strong social norms and levels of trust); better health; and more 
effective institutions of democratic participation in terms of linking citizens with 
government. If we look at those alongside Layard’s Big Seven, considered else-
where in this volume, we see an interesting degree of correlation.
 But a further dimension to this is the significance of religion for engendering 
forms of social capital. Robert Putnam has probably led the way in charting how 
religious values and organizations serve as rich sources of social capital which 
foster precisely those networks and relationships that seem to contribute most 
decisively to healthy social networks, and thus to our quality of life. As Putnam 
reports, churchgoers were ‘substantially more likely to be involved in secular 
organizations, to vote and participate politically in other ways and to have deeper 
informal social connections’ (Putnam 2000: 6). The distinctiveness of churchgo-
ers’ values and attitudes – the theological wellspring of their motivations – has 
variously been described as ‘faithful’ or ‘spiritual’ capital (Commission on 
Urban Life and Faith 2006).2 The Commission on Urban Life and Faith used this 
term to describe the effect of churches on the life of their neighbourhoods: quan-
titative but also qualitative. It is intended to link the sense of strong values that 
guided and informed the activism – and that the two are indivisible.
 If religion is one of the most potent sources of strong values and principles 
that appear to make the difference as people steer their way through the world, 
then this is precisely because it represents a powerful synthesis of beliefs and 
action. We might term this ‘performative’ faithful capital: where belief and prac-
tice are indivisible, something also encapsulated well in understandings of 
praxis, as value- driven, value- directed action, or of phronesis, or practical 
wisdom. This only serves, however, to highlight the question of the relationship 
between values and practices: the literature on religious/social capital, or faithful 
capital, is increasingly converging on the impossibility of separating the two. It 
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resists, therefore, a straightforwardly functionalist reading of the contribution of 
religion to wider society, that faith merely ‘delivers’ social goods and should be 
evaluated on its efficiency or effectiveness in so doing, as any other 
organization.
‘Virtuous capital’
As John Atherton argues, this establishes a strong continuity between ethics and 
religion, or between market economics and welfare economics (Atherton 2008: 
131). It also resonates powerfully with other literatures on the foundations of 
healthy social capital, and especially the role of religion in nurturing bonding, 
bridging and linking the social relationships and networks that appear to be so 
crucial in fostering wellbeing. This then takes us further still into the territory of 
virtue ethics and teleology, because they form part of the realization within the 
happiness and wellbeing literature of the centrality of people’s goals and values. 
It is about being able to establish some basic criteria of human flourishing – of 
what actually constitutes a life well lived – in order to be able to make some 
judgements about what is good for us. Insofar as virtue ethics represents differ-
ent accounts of the ‘good life’ and especially in theologically derived virtue 
ethics, the idea that the good is related to the ends for which humans are believed 
to have been created, it occupies a prominent position.
 In Aristotle’s thought, the good life was defined in terms of the pursuit of 
happiness, or eudaimonia. This entailed the achievement of one’s ultimate goal, 
or telos, which was essentially about shaping one’s life according to the virtues 
of excellence, learning and pleasure. Christian theologians such as Augustine 
and Aquinas put that in a Christian framework, in which virtue was about con-
forming to God’s purposes, a goal that could only be fully fulfilled in the after-
life. This became adapted in later medieval times to a conformity to the precepts 
of natural law. So there is an ontological as well as a moral dimension to the 
normative basis of happiness and wellbeing: we are most fulfilled when becom-
ing and attaining our highest calling and our most authentic being, which in tra-
ditional Christian theology is to become what God has created us to be, by 
practising the virtues of faith, hope, love and charity with the assistance of divine 
grace.
 Eudaimonia is traditionally translated as happiness, although the philosopher 
Elizabeth Anscombe has preferred the term ‘flourishing’, a concept that has also 
recently re- entered moral discourse with the work of Grace Jantzen, who explic-
itly contrasts it and the worldview it embodies with the language and terminol-
ogy of ‘salvation’ (Jantzen 1996). The aim of the ‘good life’ in virtue terms for 
Jantzen is not to seek rescue from a fallen and corrupt world, but to promote the 
values of new life, creativity and justice in ways that propel us towards ‘becom-
ing divine’ (Jantzen 1998). Other philosophers and theologians have emphasized 
the importance of moral agency and choice: the good is something that has to be 
chosen, there has to be an element of freedom, it is not about simply following a 
predestined life- course, or following prescribed rules. Arguably, what makes any 
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action moral is the necessity of choosing between conflicting goods, or even 
lesser evils. In that respect we return to a useful strand in virtue ethics, which is 
about how one cultivates the gifts of moral discernment: seeking and attaining 
the good and our own wellbeing and that of the planet is not only about follow-
ing a path, but acquiring the map- reading skills by which one ‘navigates’ one’s 
course through life.
 The life which cultivates virtue is preferable for many to alternative traditions 
of moral reasoning, such as Kantian ethics (rule- governed), or utilitarianism or 
consequentialism. The alternative of ‘right action’ versus ‘good consequences’ 
may be resolved by an emphasis on the qualities of the moral agent – but we 
cannot escape the question of what nurtures and sustains the practical wisdom of 
that moral individual; nor the need to consider whether in fact it is not about 
individual virtue but an ecology of virtue in which the individual’s participation 
in a community’s shared ethos is what cultivates the practical wisdom of 
discernment.
 The revival of virtue ethics in theology could usefully connect with this liter-
ature on wellbeing therefore, since it offers a way of reconciling the potential 
conflict between law and grace, while indicating such a framework in the public 
domain: a ‘more dialogic approach to Christian ethics [which] attempts to main-
tain the integrity of religious traditions, while drawing out the potential for 
mutual understanding between them – both within Christianity and between 
Christianity and other faith or non- faith-based groups’ (Garnett et al. 2006: 201). 
This takes us into debate about how questions of value and how notions of the 
good can be negotiated in pluralist societies, and what role is afforded to any 
religious traditions. Can religion be taken seriously as a wellspring of public 
values, or is it to be seen purely as a sectional, fiduciary language only for the 
faithful?
 The point is that religious people do have a long history of thinking about 
values, many of which they share across traditions and many of which have actu-
ally informed the cultural worldviews in which secular people find themselves. 
So it is that dialectic, that sense that Christian identity, like that of other religious 
and cultural traditions, has always developed in particular contexts and through 
constant processes of change and revision, interacting with other worldviews, 
religious and secular, that needs to be affirmed: a convergence of theologically- 
grounded notions of virtue with those of others.
 Yet equally, it may be asked whether Christians should be more wary of 
having anything to do with a concept as banal and self- seeking as ‘happiness’. 
The strong counter- cultural and eschatological nature of early Christianity would 
suggest that new life in Christ and the task of entering the Kingdom have little or 
nothing to do with living happily ever after, with contentment with one’s lot or 
settling for social conformity. The Church’s memory of Jesus is of one who 
preached no cheap grace, but rather warned of the hatred, persecution and abuse 
they would encounter (Matt 10: 24–39). If this is the corporate memory of a per-
secuted community, then it also reflects the shared conviction that Christian dis-
cipleship is a process of constant struggle towards the parousia that speaks of 
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Religion and the practices of happiness  229
God’s radical intervention in human affairs, rather than the ameliorative gradual-
ism of history, as the ultimate goal to which the faithful should aspire.
 This idea is that happiness is to be found in a struggle within a world which is 
governed by the dynamics of tragedy rather than comedy, of suffering in the face 
of overwhelming moral complexity rather than the restoration of order and 
stability. It is also present in the Aristotelian teleology in which a life virtuously 
lived is constantly tested against notions of the good and excellent which involve 
ends and values that transcend mere self- interest or subsistence. Yet ‘being 
good’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘being happy’: admittedly, the Aristo-
telian tradition, later taken up by natural law theory, teaches that virtue and 
goodness are all about orientating ourselves towards that which will authenti-
cally fulfil our true natures. Surely, then, we should be happy if we are becoming 
truly ourselves; but Christian theology would also teach that if we live in a fallen 
world in which the limitations and flaws of sin are an ever- present reality, then 
we can never be complacent about simply following our own desires.
 It also propels us towards some of the more communitarian traditions, repre-
sented by theologians such as Stanley Hauerwas, in which the emphasis is on 
inhabiting the habitus of a community which tells the stories by which the good 
life is to be guided: this again is about cultivating habits of discernment in the 
context of particular practices of virtue (Hauerwas 1981). It is through participa-
tion in community that we learn to consider and evaluate the lives of others; in 
communities of faith, there is the (perhaps unique) opportunity to connect with 
the lives of those in other cultures (by virtue of the global nature of many faiths) 
as well as across many generations and historical epochs. This constitutes a 
unique brand of ‘cultural capital’. We need communities as schools of virtue, as 
the places that nurture us. This is not only characteristic of Hauerwas and other 
forms of post- liberal Christian ethics, but is reminiscent of Alasdair Macintyre’s 
famous evocation of ‘practice’ as inherent to moral action (Macintyre 1985). 
Practices and virtue are mutually reinforcing, in that seeking the good may only 
be attained by participating in the specific practices that enable us to achieve 
excellence or virtue in that very pursuit. If certain traditions or communities are 
the bearers of standards of excellence or virtue, then cultivation of the goods 
which they embody may only be reached by means of participation:
After all, if being trained in virtue is like learning the skills for practising a 
craft, or for making and appreciating good music or art, or becoming aware 
of how to eat healthily, then Christianity can provide teaching, practices and 
disciplines, mentors and communities in which to be so trained.
(Harris 2006: 210)
This makes the link between this tradition of virtue and communitarian ethics, 
since it is essentially arguing that people cannot be schooled in virtue in abstract. 
These values have to be embodied and located, because essentially virtue, good-
ness and wellbeing are what might be called ‘performative’ values. It is therefore 
the respect to which virtue ethics is not only about a vision of the good, but about 
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the practice – cultivating and embodying – of particular ways of life by which 
the good may be realized. In that respect, it does not need to be heavily prescrip-
tive or abstract but quite concrete. It is about how practices shape our moral 
selves and build lives well lived, whether that is framed in terms of a telos or life 
goal. Yet it also suggests that this needs to be quite a reflective task, in which the 
twin elements of the vision of the good and the enactment of the life well lived 
need to be brought into active correlation. It suggests that virtue and cultivation 
of virtue also rest on the cultivation of what we might call ‘practical wisdom’ – 
as a form of theological reflection, or moral discernment.
Towards practical wisdom
‘Practical wisdom’, or practical reasoning, has tended to be regarded as inferior 
to more lofty forms of knowledge, which perhaps reflects a split in the Western 
intellectual tradition between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. If the former is about gen-
eralizable, universalizable knowledge, which models an ideal type or representa-
tion of the world, then the latter is the field of action which may certainly be 
used to test out theories or hypotheses, or develop them, or find exceptions, or 
even disseminate knowledge; but it is rarely seen as the place which prompts 
research or generates theory. There is a sense that practice is the place of ‘appli-
cation’ of theoretical constructs formulated elsewhere; it is secondary, inert. 
However, this division or configuration of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ itself has a 
history (Gumbrecht 2004).
 So there has been a return to Aristotle’s definitions in the Nicomachean Ethics in 
which he places phronesis (or practical wisdom) alongside Sophia (wisdom). If 
Sophia is the ability to speculate on universal truths, then phronesis is more stra-
tegic, as the form of knowledge geared towards achieving specific goods. But this 
is, for Aristotle, a reflective and deliberative skill, and not just simple technique. 
More recently, with the revival of ideas of practical wisdom, not least in the training 
of many professionals, this is strongly linked with notions of virtue and the good, 
insofar as practical wisdom is concerned with producing right action, ‘bringing 
about a good end for humans in general and for each unique individual’ (Lauder 
1994: 93). As some voices in professional education have argued, such practical 
wisdom may not necessarily involve rule- based or Kantian behaviour, but a complex 
interrelation of thinking and doing – or even being – by which implicit values guide 
discernment in relation to specific contexts, networks or relationships. ‘The goal is 
not some pre- determined end but is instead a result of affirming oneself in spite of 
the events and circumstances which might prevent an individual achieving their 
potential or finding some meaning in life- health experience’ (Lauder 1994: 95).
 As Harriet Harris argues, virtue theory always has to transform itself into 
practice, since it is concerned not with virtue in abstract but with particular 
virtues (Harris 2006: 212). Similarly, paralleling the literature on happiness and 
wellbeing, it is in the context of relationships, ways of life and institutions – in 
the corporate traditions we inhabit and help to form, reflexively, as they are 
shaping us – that the virtues are forged and demonstrated:
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Virtuous living is learned by being practised. It is nurtured . . . in the com-
munities and institutions that shape our lives, especially families, schools, 
churches, and other religious institutions, colleges, places of work, com-
munity groups, and political and charitable organizations.
(Harris 2006: 210)
The concept of theology as ‘practical wisdom’ has achieved prominence in 
recent years, especially in liberation (Gutierrez 1973) practical (Graham 1996) 
and systematic theology (Charry 1997). In their various ways, such sources 
claim that theology has what Ellen Charry terms an ‘aretegenic’ function, as dis-
course aimed towards the formation of Christian character or identity. Know-
ledge of, or talk about, God is intended to cultivate virtue; but – echoing 
Macintyre’s model of moral reasoning – it is more than scientia, or dispassionate 
knowledge, and is better characterized as sapentia, or the wisdom that comes 
from relationship. In more postmodern versions of practical theology (Graham 
1996), practice itself is the primary medium of truth, but this is not simply to 
reduce the nature of God or God- talk to human action. Instead, it is to argue that 
by fixing their attention on the goodness of God, Christians shape their perform-
ances and ‘practise what they preach’ as words are enacted in faithful action. It 
is essentially a ‘virtuous circle’ from practice, to theology to practice. From the 
practical, everyday dilemmas of faith comes the need to articulate guiding prin-
ciples, stories, images and values which can constitute the practical wisdom – 
the grammar – of discipleship. In turn, practical activities of healing, nurturing, 
sustaining and transforming are normatively shaped by the tradition. Amidst the 
necessarily unsystematic character of human action and relationships, Christians 
uphold the essentially theological nature of human practical wisdom, informing 
faithful and transformative practice. The primary language of theology is articu-
lated in the practical wisdom of human care; only as a second stage does it find 
expression in systematic doctrinal propositions. This is not to reduce all theol-
ogy- in/as- practice to human pastoral care, however. Without the horizon of 
divine wisdom, such practice becomes self- referential or reducible to ethics. This 
understanding of theology as practised, however, refuses such a division between 
theory and practice, and insists that God is both immanent and transcendent: 
apprehended in, but never reducible to, human experience.
 This is not unfamiliar within public theology. Heinrich Bedford- Strohm 
(2007) speaks of ‘bilingualism’, capable of giving an account of its own roots 
and sources, but capable of addressing a wider audience too.3 Yet my point is 
that such dialogue is not propositional but performative. This notion of the con-
tribution of theology is essentially a form of wisdom that is enacted and commu-
nicated in the life of its practitioners, yet is accessible to a wider public not by 
virtue of its ability to understand the finer points of doctrine but by its ability to 
‘read’ and witness the lived reality of that community: ‘By their fruits shall ye 
know them.’ Such a performative theology, enacted in the practical wisdom of 
the community, is weighty in terms of its value- ladenness, but tangible in the 
public nature of its demonstration.
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 I have been asking to what extent should Christians be called to a self- 
contained life of virtue that rests exclusively on the narratives of faith and mores 
of the internal community, and to what extent can their inherited values overlap 
with those of other worldviews? Would we agree with ethicists such as Hauer-
was that ‘Christian social insights cannot be shared with others except with those 
who participate in the faith from which they come’ (Atherton 2008: 7)? This is 
to some extent what underlies a principal fault- line in contemporary public theo-
logy today, namely between the communitarian or holiness traditions repre-
sented by thinkers such as Stanley Hauerwas or John Milbank, versus the liberal 
perspectives of Reinhold Niebuhr, Duncan Forrester or Charles Taylor. The 
reality is that people draw their concepts of the good life from a variety of 
sources, Christians being no exception; the point of contention is what aspects of 
such influences – Scripture, the corporate narrative of tradition, secular reason, 
experience – should prove ultimately binding. Understandings of happiness are 
lived out and formed in a variety of settings – and the complexity of modern life 
is such that any mature adult will inevitably encounter a plethora of such mes-
sages in the course of a single day, just by watching a television soap opera, 
passing advertising billboards, reading a bedtime story to their children, listening 
to politicians, let alone reading the sacred texts of their tradition (which are not 
in themselves monolithic in their visions). These are the raw materials out of 
which practical wisdom is negotiated; but ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ are to be held in 
tension, and neither collapsed nor assimilated in the process.
 William Cavanaugh provides a helpful metaphor for this when he returns to 
Augustine’s idea of the ‘city of God’ to examine how Christians are to manage 
the balance between religious faith and public reason, the tensions of disciple-
ship and citizenship. He describes the two realms not as separate self- contained 
worlds, as almost virtual spaces, overlapping each other; but they are primarily 
performative spaces, in which different narratives (in our case of wellbeing and 
human fulfilment) are lived out:
Envisioning the two cities as performances helps us to avoid some serious 
problems with the way the church is imagined. The church as God sees it – 
the Body of Christ – is not a human institution with well- defined bounda-
ries, clearly distinguishable from the secular body politic. The church is not 
a polis, but a set of practices or performances that participate in the history 
of salvation that God is unfolding on earth . . . The church is not a separate 
enclave, but . . . it joins with others to perform the city of God.
(Cavanaugh 2006: 318, emphasis added)
The Church is not preaching to the world or delivering generic moral principles; 
it is, primarily, demonstrating its distinctive ethic within the world, creating a 
shared space in which some views of the good life are mutually discovered and 
celebrated, but also able to create an alternative oikumene, or household or polit-
ical economy, in which different models of human flourishing and unconditional 
regard – an economy of grace rather than reward – may also be practised. But 
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Religion and the practices of happiness  233
prompted by Cavanaugh’s terminology of space, performance and boundaries, I 
am inclined to characterize public theology as a liminal discipline, which locates 
itself at the threshold, which encourages traffic from the sanctuary into the street, 
fostering the secular vocation of those who need to be articulate in the vernacu-
lars of production, consumption and citizenship as well as the dramas of grace, 
redemption and sacrifice.
 To conclude: the happiness literature stresses the importance of values and 
plentiful, rich social capital such as networks of friends, intimacy, meaningful 
and rewarding (in all sense of the word) pursuits. It is also pointing to evidence 
which suggests that religion and participation in organized religion is effective at 
fostering that kind of social capital. While I have been arguing, however, that 
Christianity may have some distinctive insights to offer in terms of a particular 
practical wisdom of human flourishing, this still needs to be accountable and 
accessible to a wider world. The Christian theological contribution is drawn to 
some kind of bilingualism, or mediation between the many sources and visions 
of happiness and goodness on offer. It is a balance of faith and reason, engage-
ment in the world and immersion in tradition, but then, as Kathryn Tanner says, 
theology has always been dependent on ‘borrowed materials’ (Tanner 1997: 
61–92). A high theology of creation and incarnation requires that it is within this 
world, and in the vernacular of human affairs, that effective discipleship is 
undertaken. There is a tension, but no ultimate contradiction, between the imper-
atives of ‘citizenship’ and ‘discipleship’. In the words of the Sri Lankan theolo-
gian Wesley Ariarajah, ‘At the global level, there is an increasing recognition 
that the world’s problems are not Christian problems requiring Christian 
answers, but human problems that must be addressed together by all human 
beings’ (Ariarajah 1998: 327).
 Similarly, it is a question of ‘happiness’ being both of this world and beyond 
this world, which is a perfectly theologically orthodox perspective, given the 
Christian dispensation which acknowledges both the promise of the Kingdom in 
the light of the resurrection and the gifts of the Spirit at the same time as knowing 
that such promises remain to be fully inaugurated this side of the eschaton. This 
reflects a perennial tradition of living at the threshold between sacred and secular; 
the ‘now’ land, the ‘not yet’ and between the Gospel of ‘common grace’ and meta-
noia. This may permit us to conceive of overlap, if not convergence, of many 
worldviews and value commitments, in order that Christians can occupy the same 
space as others without compromising a theologically robust vision. If Christian 
faith and practice has anything to teach the world about happiness and the life well 
lived, such wealth and wisdom must be offered in the name of a common human-
ity and a shared concern for its ultimate flourishing.
Notes
1 This chapter is a revised version of an article (Graham 2009a) which first appeared in a 
special edition of the International Journal of Public Theology entitled ‘Faith, Welfare 
and Well- being: New Directions’, edited by Francis Davis and Andrew Bradstock.
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2 I would defend the term ‘faithful capital’ against its critics because of its ability to hold 
together in synthesis the dimensions of religious (as in practice- based outcomes) and 
spiritual (as in values or beliefs). ‘Faithful’ is performative, praxis- oriented, in terms of 
values enacted and embodied in their outworking, where the actions themselves point 
toward their point of transcendent origin.
3 Elsewhere, I have spoken of this process as one of ‘mediation’ (Graham 2009b: 146).
706_18_Happiness.indd   234 27/4/10   11:24:49
